When a man who is arguably the greatest living philosopher of space and time asserts that the question of creation in physical cosmology is a 'pseudo-problem' (Grunbaum [1990]), then the natural theologian and philosopher of religion had better sit up and take notice. According to Grunbaum, the question of the origin of the universe is, indeed, a genuine problem which is addressed by physical cosmology; but he diSerentiates this from the pseudo-problem of the universe's creation. Whereas the former problem concerns whether the universe is temporally finite in the past, the latter seeks an 'external cause' of the beginning of the universe, particularly a divine cause, or God. Grunbaum argues that this latter question is not merely pseudo-science, but a pseudo-problem altogether. Now the natural theologian may certainly agree that the origin of the universe and the creation of the universe are conceptually distinct in that the latter alone has reference to a cause. He will no doubt also agree that terms like ' creation', ' annihilation', ' nothing ', and so fortht are used by physicists in philosophically misleading ways. He may even agree that the problem of creation is not properly a part of physical cosmology, but is a meta-physical problem. But if he stands in the tradition of the kalam cosmological argument, it will be his contention that the origin of the universe implies the creation of the universe, since it is metaphysically impossible that the universe came into being spontaneously out of nothing.
Unfortunately, the dutifully attentive natural theologian will no doubt be disappointed (and somewhat amazed) at the superficiality of Grunbaum's critique. Not only does Grunbaum's article appear to be little more than a warmed-over version of a previous critique published over 35 According to Grunbaum, the argument is based on the premiss that 'Everything has a cause', and it proceeds to inquire as to the cause of the universe, assuming tacitly that the physical universe had a temporal beginning. It concludes that the universe as a whole had a beginning in the finite past as the result of an act of creation out of nothing by a single, conscious, external cause, or agent, who is then claimed to be God. Now this is a gross caricature of the traditional argument, as Grunbaum ought to know from the references he cites (Craig [19 79] ). The causal premiss operative in the argument is not that everything has a cause, but that 'Whatever begins to exist has a cause'. I can think of no prominent philosopher or natural theologian who held that everything has a cause, except for some Enlightenment rationalists who by 'cause' meant something more like 'explanation' or 'reason'. This fact has been repeatedly pointed out by theists, but stereotypes seem to die hard. Furthermore, proponents of this argument did not simply assume that the universe began to exist, but presented elaborate philosophical defenses of this premiss, employing arguments against infinite temporal regression such as came to be embodied in the thesis of Kant's first antinomy concerning time. Finally, the identification of the external cause of the universe's inception was not gratuitously assumed to be a personal Creator; rather the proof's proponents argued for this conclusion on the basis of the fact that a temporal effect could not arise from an eternal cause unless that cause were a personal agent.
Grunbaum goes on to present three groups of objections against his misconstruction of the cosmological argument. Group I seems to draw into doubt the concept of 'cause' in the argument: (i) The concept is used equivocally, since in the premiss it refers to causes which transform previously existing materials from one state to another, whereas in the conclusion it refers to a cause which creates ex nihilo. (ii) It does not follow from the causal premiss that the first cause is a conscious agent. (iii) It is logically fallacious to infer that there is a single conscious agent responsible for the first state of the total physical universeW To which it may be answered: (i) The univocal concept of ' cause ' employed in premiss and conclusion alike is the concept of efficient causality, that is to say, something which produces or brings into being its effects. Whether such production involves transformation of previously existing materials or creation ex nihilo is completely incidental. That this is so is evident from the fact that the proponent of the argument must confront and deal with the objection that the first cause may not have created ex nihilo, but instead transformed an eternal, quiescent universe into a universe in change (Craig [1979] , pp. 99-102; Goetz [1989] ; Craig [1991] ). So the argument is clearly not equivocal.l (ii) Of course, not all efficient causes are personal; but apart from agent causation it is extremely difficult to explain how a temporal universe could have arisen from a state of changeless eternity (Craig [1979] , pp. 149-53, idem. [1991] ). (iii) The inference to a single external cause, while not following strictly from the argument proper, seems justified in light of the principle that one should not multiply causes beyond necessity. For his part, Grunbaum cannot seem to decide whether the argument commits the fallacy of composition or involves a quantifier shift. But it seems obvious that the argument runs neither 'Everything in the universe has a cause; therefore, the whole universe has a cause' nor 'Every thing has a cause; therefore, there is one cause of every thing'. Rather the argument is a logically impeccable example of universal instantiation: 'Whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore, the universe has a cause.' That the universe is a thing which began to exist becomes all the more obvious in light of modern cosmology, since in the very earliest stages of the universe individual things did not exist within it.
Group II objections seem to focus on the claim that the temporal regress of events must be finite and terminate in an uncaused first cause: (i) Causality is logically compatible with physical causal chains which extend infinitely into the past. (ii) If everything has a cause of its existence, then we must ask for the cause of God's existence.
Again, the natural theologian will reply: (i) It is not the concept of causality as such which is incompatible with infinite temporal regression. Rather the incompatibility is between the concept of actual infinity and a temporal
The deeper issue here, not discussed by Grunbaum, is whether all efficient causes must be merely transformative. In his earlier piece, he asserted that in daily life and science things are always made from previously existing materials rather than nothing (Grunbaum [1954] , p. 15). This may be so (depending on how we regard mental entities and miracle claims); but even if that is the case, we are not thereby forced to posit a material cause for the universe, if, on the basis of philosophical argument and scientific cosmology, we come to conclude that it began to exist. But what is necessary, on the pain of absurdity, is that it shall have had at least an efficient cause. That conclusion is not based merely upon the experiences of daily life and science. While we may come to believe that whatever begins to exist has an efficient cause because of our experience with transformative causes, not only is that no proof that all efficient causes are or must be transformative, but deeper reflection also reveals that the first premiss of the kalam cosmological argument, while confirmed by inductive experience, is based primarily in the metaphysical insight that something cannot arise spontaneously from nothing, so that a beginning-to-be ex nihilo would have to have a creative cause. The issue, then, is whether the universe had an absolute beginning. 23l ) regress of events. Grunbaum's attempts to write oW the belief in the impossibility of an infinite past as due to 'thought fatigue' or a quantifier shift ('Every thing does not exist at some time; therefore, there is a single time at which everything does not exist') merely exposes his unfamiliarity with the arguments involved.2 (ii) No version of the cosmological argument has ever contended that everything has a cause. According to the kaiam version exrerything that begins to exist has a cause. Since God is eternal, He requires no cause, whereas the universe, which began to exist, does.
The objections of Group III are directed at assertions that divine creatio ex nihilo surpasses all understanding: (i) If creatio ex nihilo is incomprehensible, then belief in such a doctrine is irrational. (ii) An incomprehensible doctrine cannot serve as an explanation for anything.
But the natural theologian has a ready response: (i) Creatio ex nihilo is not incomprehensible in Grunbaum's sense. The doctrine may be mysterious in that we do not know how God brought the universe into being, but the doctrine that He did so makes a clear and well-understood assertion, as is evident from the fact that we are debating it. Whether one accepts the doctrine on the basis of philosophical argument, scientific evideEsce, or revelation, the statement that a finite time ago God brought the universe into being out of nothing is not meaningless jibberish, but expresses a proposition with intelligible content. (ii) Therefore, the doctrine most certainly does constitute a purported explanation of the origin of the world. The natural theologian could quite cheerfully concede that it is not a ssientiQc explanation; but it is an explanation nonetheless, a philosophical or metaphysical explanation.
These objections are so flimsy that one cannot help but wonder who it is that they are meant to refute. Who are these unnamed theists whose contentions Grunbaum attacks? What philosopher of religion or natural theologian in the history of thought is supposed to be susceptible to these objections? One suspects that Grunbaum is really attacking popular misconceptions of the cosmological argument; but then what justification is there for attacking such straw men in a scholarly publication? 2 In his earlier article, we find an additional objection: if it said that an infinite past tione could not have elapsed and therefore the universe could not have existed forever, then one may retort that the Deity must also have been created at some time, since it, too, couId not have existed forever (Grunbaum [1954] , p. 15). But the proponents of the kalam argument maintained that God is timeless sans the world, so that the objection finds no foothold (Craig [1980] ). In the same place Grunbaum also argues that there is no more difflculty in an infinite past than in an infinite future. But that is the case only if one adepts his B-theoretic view of time; on an A-theory no future exists. In this earlier piece (which is, incidentally, a much more careful critique thars the recent re-write), Grunbaum also asserts that modern ma$hematics gives infinity a positive mathematical and physical meaning. But what he does not demorlstrate is that the logical consistency of Cantorian infinite set thevty and transfinite arithmetic (given their axioms and conventions) implies that an actual infinite is ontologically possible.
The natural theologian's disappointment and surprise with regard to Grunbaum's critique will not be allayed by his discussion of the 'New Creation Argument', for little advance is made over Grunbaum's 1952 This is a curious argument, in which Grunbaum appears to assert that it belongs analytically to the concept of some entity x's beginning to exist that there were instants of time prior to x's beginning at which x did not exist. Perhaps we can express this by stating ' x begins to exist' =def ' X exists at time t and there are times immediately prior to t at which x does not exist.'
But it seems very strange that x's beginning to exist at t entails the existence of temporal instants prior to t. Imagine that the temporal instants prior to a performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony were non-existent. Should we say that the symphony concert then fails to have a beginning, even though it is precisely the same concert as that which is contingently preceded by temporal moments? Grunbaum gives no argument for this claim. time. Thus, it is meaingful to speak both of the cause of the Big Bang and of the beginning of the universe. But are we to think that these notions become meaningless due simply to the contingent fact that God may not have been thinking discursively in the state of affairs in which He exists alone without the universe7 In short, I see no reason why in case (i) we may not speak intelligibly of a beginning of the universe at t = O and inquire concerning the cause of this event.
What about case (ii), according to which the singularity exists on the boundary of space-time, rather than as an event in space-time? According to this model, there is no first instant of time even though one may designate a first interval of time of arbitrary finite duration, just as there is no smallest fraction in the finite interval between O and 1. Grunbaum's salient point here is that once again there are no temporal instants prior to the singularity, so that questions concerning the beginning and creation of the universe are illegitimate. Obviously, however, Grunbaum's argument concerning case (ii) makes no advance over his unsound objections to case (i). His conclusion that matter has always existed, though the age of the universe is finite, is mere word play the key concept here is permanence, and that is a much more subtle issue than Grunbaum allows (see Smith [1989] ). The universe has 'always' existed in the sense that there is no past moment of physical time at which it did not exist; but it has not 'always' existed in the strong sense of being permanent, since it had a beginning of its existence, and therefore it is sensible to ask for its cause.
Turning then from classical to quantum cosmology, Grunbaum maintains that such models provide no warrant for invoking an external cause for the quantum mechanical vacuum from which the observable universe is supposed to have emerged. Grunbaum's handling of these models is, as I said, based upon a single secondary source, and he conflates two distinct types of quantum cosmological models, namely, vacuum fluctuation models associated with Tryon, Brout, Englert et al., and the wave functional model of the universe espoused by Hartle and Hawking. I have elsewhere argued that neither of these approaches provides an empirically plausible alternative to the hypothesis of creation and that they are no less metaphysical than theism (Craig [1990] ; idem tforthcoming]). Rather than repeat those arguments here, let me say only that vacuum fluctuation models face, among other difflculties, the severe problem of explaining the existence of our relatively young cosmos if the quantum mechanical background space is supposed to have existed from eternity (Barrow and Tipler [1986] , pp. 605-6), and the Hartle-Hawking model is predicated upon a physically unintelligible and metaphysically misguided substitution of imaginary time for ontological time. It seems to me, therefore, that Grunbaum has not succeeded in showing that it is misleading or inappropriate to talk about the beginning of the universe in the context of current scientific cosmology nor that it is philosophically unintelligible to ask for a cause of that beginning.
CONCLUSION
In summary, while a distinction between the origin and creation of the universe can (and should) be made, Grunbaum's refusal to regard the latter as anything more than a pseudo-problem is very poorly founded. His objections to the traditional kalam cosmological argument were largely aimed at straw men or else misconceived, while his reservations about the beginning of the universe in current cosmology were based on idiosyncratic definitions. The question of the creation of the universe is a genuine philosophical problem that deserves discussion. 
